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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The evidence introduced at trial and assumed to be
true by the trial court in its f.i -ilnqs was clear that the
motor behicle under Mr. Bean's control at the time of his
arrest, was inoperable, and that Mi . i^dn ridu not driven
the vehicle to where it became inoperable.

The Court

should have taken these facts into consideration and found
that Mr. Bean was not in actual physical control of an
operable motor vehicle.
ARGUMENT
I. THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDINGS DO NOT
SUPPORT MR. BEAN'S CONVICTION.
In Garcia v. Schwendiman, 645 P.2d 651 (Utah 1982),
the Utah Supreme Court noted:
The standard for appellate review
of factual findings affords great
deference to the trial court's view of
the evidence unless the trial court
has misapplied the law or its findings
are clearly against the weight of
evidence. _Id. a t 65 3.
In this case, r 11

Be a n d o e s n't question the

accuracy of the trial court's findings.
\

In fact, it is

; position that the trial court's findings are correct.
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In their entirety, the court's findings are as
follows:
FINDING OF FACT
The court finds the following to
have been established:
On November 2, 1985, the
defendant, David A. Bean, was observed
by a Sandy City police officer sitting
behind the steering wheel of a motor
vehicle, attempting to start the same.
The defendant was never observed in
the passenger side of the vehicle, the
defendant said he was having car
trouble and told the officer to "smell
the carb'."
The only direct evidence on the
issue of who had driven the vehicle to
the spot where the defendant was
observed trying to start it was
provided by the defendant and his
brother, Michael Bean. At trial, each
testified that Michael Bean had been
driving the vehicle. (R at 63).
Further, in applying these findings, the trial court
stated that it accepted as true Mr. Bean's claim that his
brother drove the vehicle to the place where the officer
arrested Mr. Bean.

(R at 64).

Under the Garcia standard of review language, Mr.
Bean's only contention in this appeal is that the trial
court misapplied the law.

Without making a finding as to

whether the vehicle was operable, the trial court held
that the fact that Mr. Bean was behind the wheel of the
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vehicle, attempting to start the vehicle, was sufficient
to establish that Mr. Bean was in actual physical control
of the vehicle for purposes of the Sandy City DUI
Ordinance.
However, the trial court also noted the Utah Supreme
Court f s holding in Garcia, that:
[the] purpose of the actual
physical control language of Utah's
implied consent statute should be read
as intending to prevent intoxicated
drivers from entering their vehicles
except as passengers or passive
occupants... (R at 64), quoting Garcia
at 654.
Sandy City, in its Brief, admits that, "If a vehicle is
visibly inoperable...an occupant would generally not be in
actual physical control."

Brief of Respondent at page 13.

These statements exhibit a fundamental inconsistency in
the position taken by the trial court and Sandy City.
First, if a vehicle is inoperable, it is inoperable
whether or not the problem with the vehicle is readily
apparent.

Second, if the vehicle is inoperable, then

anyone who occupies the vehicle can be no more than a
passive passenger.
inoperable.

In the case at issue, the vehicle was

It would not start at the time of Mr. Bean's

arrest, nor would it start after it was towed to the
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impound garage.

The vehicle would not start until Mr.

Bean's brother put gas in it.
The purpose of this appeal is to determine from the
findings of the trial court if Mr. Bean was in "actual
physical control" of the vehicle.

Although the trial

court did not make a specific finding concerning the
operability of the vehicle Mr. Bean was in, the facts show
that it would not run.

This is important because the

trial court accepted the fact that Mr. Bean did not drive
the vehicle to the place where the officer arrested him.
Therefore, if Mr. Bean was in "actual physical control" of
the vehicle, it must have been from the time when his
brother left the vehicle to the time that the officer
arrived at the scene.
The decisions of the Utah Supreme Court and other
jurisdiction as set forth in Mr. Bean's Brief of Appellant
indicate that operability of a vehicle is a factor to be
considered in determining whether a person in the vehicle
is in actual physical control.
trial court do

Therefore, findings of the

not support Mr. Bean's conviction

under Sandy City Ordinance §119(1)(a).
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II. REASONABLE MINDS COULD DIFFER AS TO
WHETHER MR. BEAN COULD EXERCISE ACTUAL
PHYSICAL CONTROL OVER THE VEHICLE.
The circumstances surrounding Mr. Bean's arrest are
important because they distinguish his case from the cases
Sandy City cited to support Mr. Bean's conviction.
Garcia, supra, Lopez v. Schwendimanf 720 P.2d 778
(Utah 1986) , and most of the others cited by Sandy City
rely on facts which either establish that the person
arrested drove the vehicle to the place where the police
made the arrest, or that the person arrested could have
operated the vehicle.
In citing Lopez in its Brief at page 11, Sandy City
misrepresents the context in which the statement quoted
was made.

While the Utah Supreme Court held that the

statute was not to be construed to exclude those whose
vehicles were immobile due to mechanical failures, the
language of the court leading up to this statement
indicates that operability can be a factor in examining
whether a person has actual physical control over a
vehicle.

The court nol-orl, wifh approval, t ho drr-ision by

the Washington Court of Appeals in State v. Smelter, 674
P.2d 690, 693.

In Smelter, the court recognized that no

single fact establishes guilt or innocence in DUI cases.
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It is the totality of the circumstances upon which a
conviction is to be based.

That is:

How did the vehicle

get to the point where the arrest was made; what type of
authority did the arrested person exert over the vehicle
and by implication, what was the operating condition of
the vehicle?

Lopez at 781.

The fact that the vehicle in which Mr. Bean was found
was inoperable, by itself, does not establish his
innocence.

However, that fact, when viewed with the fact

that Mr. Bean did not drive the vehicle to the place
where the police arrested him, shows that Mr. Bean was never
in "actual physical control" of an operable vehicle.
While the facts in the case at issue may or may not have
been sufficient to justify revocation of Mr. Bean's
license in an administrative action as was the case in
Lopez and Garcia, they do not satisfy the standard of
proof beyond a reasonable doubt, necessary to uphold Mr.
Bean's criminal conviction.
CONCLUSION
Based on the arguments contained herein and those
contained in Mr. Bean's Brief of Appellant, Mr. Bean
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requests this Court set aside his conviction tor driving
under the influence of alcohol.
DATED this
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day of March, 1989.
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